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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis “invented” the common law right to
privacy in the United States.1 They declared the need for a right to
privacy – “to be let alone”2 – because technological advancements
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1

See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1
(1979); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 57 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth
Simone Noveck eds., 2004).
2

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d. ed. 1888)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960).
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(photography) and business methods (yellow journalism) enabled the
media to bring previously private details to the attention of a much larger
audience.3 Warren and Brandeis declared, “[i]nstantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.’”4 Because of the technological innovations of their
day, the authors noted that, “solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual” than in the past.5 Concern over the sacredness
of private and domestic life led to the conclusion that “[t]he law . . . must
protect privacy on the principle of an ‘inviolate personality.’”6 In essence,
Warren and Brandeis intended to introduce continental European privacy
concepts into U.S. jurisprudence.7
[2]
In the present day, new technologies continue to provide solid
grounding for Warren and Brandeis’ concerns. Internet technologies and
various software platforms make it much easier to communicate and find
information about others’ online communication.8 For many – especially
the younger generation – the “sacred precincts” of private life have
extended onto the information superhighway.9 Individuals, both those
with the right to do so and those without, increasingly post, upload, or
share personal and private details, arguments and disputes, as well as
3

See SOLOVE, supra note 1; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.

4

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.

5

Id. at 196; see also Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy
Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1012 (2009).
6

Levin & Abril, supra note 5 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205).

7

See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004) (“[I]t is best to think of the Warren and Brandeis tort
not as a great American innovation, but as an unsuccessful continental transplant. For,
though commentators have failed to recognize it, what the two authors set out to do was
precisely to introduce the continental protection of privacy into America.”).
8

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.

9

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2; see Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.
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intellectual property to public and private directories all over the
Internet.10 Indeed, as interpersonal communication itself has shifted
increasingly to electronic media, the letter has transformed into multiple
forms of e-mail, text messages, tweets, and posts on blogs, walls, forums,
and chat rooms.11 For some, yesterday’s closet has become today’s
limited-access Facebook12 or MySpace13 profile.14 Indeed, these services
allow users to dictate whom they allow to access their posted content and
online communication.15 In fact, Facebook claims “[m]ore than 500
million active users,” of whom fifty percent “log on to [the network] in
any given day.”16 Despite the concerns put forth by Warren and Brandeis,
recent judicial decisions have denied privacy protection in information
posted to these online social networks (“OSNs”).17 These current privacy
rulings have allowed personal information to be freely “proclaimed from
the house-tops,” despite what many feel are reasonable expectations to the
contrary.18 Law enforcement agencies have increasingly resorted to
mining personal information posted to OSNs as a means to acquire
information and identify individuals suspected of criminal activity.19
10

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.

11

See Charles N. Faerber, Book Versus Byte: The Prospects and Desirability of a
Paperless Society, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 797, 827 (1999).
12

Facebook.com is a registered trademark of Facebook, Inc.

13

MySpace.com is a registered trademark of MySpace, Inc.

14

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1019.

15

See id. at 1019-20.

16

Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited
Apr. 9, 2011).
17

See, e.g., Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 864 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009); Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 27 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL);
Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 20 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); see
also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
18

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

19

See, e.g., Matthew J. Hodge, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the
“New” Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 95-96 (2006);

3
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OSNs have even played the stage for criminal confessions.20 Often, robust
privacy laws have failed to translate effectively when applied to these new
technologies.21
[3]
In an eighteenth century English case concerning copyright law, a
dissenting Justice proclaimed: “[i]t is certain every man has a right to keep
his own sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether
he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his
friends.”22 Regardless of how this right has developed in various
jurisdictions, recent cases have not given it much weight where parties
have tried to argue for privacy rights in information posted to online social
networking profiles.23 Recent cases have determined it irrelevant whether
or not the profile is accessible to the public at large or only to the user’s
“friends.”24 These cases have involved intrusion by both private and
public actors, therefore implicating both common law and constitutional
theories of privacy protection in the United States.25 Holding that there is
Autumn K. Leslie, Note, Online Social Networks and Restrictions on College Athletes:
Student Censorship?, 5 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 33 (2008).
20

See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Myspace Confession Dooms North
Augusta Bank Robber (May 28, 2009), available at http://columbia.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/2009/co052809.htm.
21

SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 6-7.

22

Millar v Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 242; 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (Yates, J.,
dissenting).
23

See generally Sharon Nelson, John Simek & Jason Foltin, The Legal Implications of
Social Networking, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2009) (noting several cases where
police use information posted to social networking sites in their investigations).
24

See Kathleen Elliot Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal
Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 375 (2010) (“Even if a user utilizes
privacy settings, it may not protect her from blurred boundaries that result in subpoenas,
discovery, ethical and legal issues, and private postings becoming public.”).
25

See Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 288, 313-14 (2001) (explaining that constitutional, common law, and legislative
approaches to privacy only afford limited protection to private and public actors utilizing
the Internet).
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet postings posits an
unreasonable standard for those who view their limited-access posts on
Facebook or MySpace as private, or at least quasi-private, where the
number of “friends” who can access the information is high, and deserving
of some sort of privacy protection.26
However, some view these
standards as dictated by individuals out of touch with the expectations of
the millions of individuals using such online services.27
[4]
Present United States privacy law – despite being made up of a
patchwork of federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common law28
– is predominantly based on the ideals of individual control, autonomy,
and liberty from governmental intrusion,29 despite the fact that its
inspiration was an idea grounded on the importance of protecting human
dignity and an “inviolate personality.”30 Comparatively, Europe has
predominantly taken the second position – that privacy protects human

26

Cf. David V. Richards, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case for
Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1357 (2007) (explaining that it is necessary to revisit the law since
much potential harm exists for Internet publication and the current law does not address
online defamation or privacy invasion).
27

See Leslie, supra note 19, at 34 (“Because online social networks are such a new
media, originating less than five years ago, little public opinion as to the privacy interest
expected therein is available since the Supreme Court has yet to deal with this issue.”
(footnotes omitted)).
28

See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 56 (“Information privacy law consists of a mosaic of
various types of law: tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law,
evidentiary privileges, property law, and contract law.”); Helms, supra note 25 (“Because
there is no absolute right to privacy, constitutional claims, privacy torts, and federal
statutes have created a patchwork of protection that protects privacy only within certain
limited situations.” (footnotes omitted)).
29

See Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and
Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTOWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 360 (2005)
(noting that Americans envision their privacy rights in terms of individual liberty,
freedom and control).
30

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205.

5
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dignity and fosters personal relationships.31 The European view also
promotes individual autonomy, although it does so in a different fashion
and perhaps to a greater extent, as this Article suggests.32 This view of
privacy and individual autonomy embeds an element of human dignity
into its analysis of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
rather than strictly tying reasonableness to ideas of control and waiver.33
This conception is also more in line with the view that “[w]ithout our
privacy, we lose ‘our very integrity as persons’ . . . .”34 Privacy may
signify a fundamental human right,35 although this view has been
challenged.36
[5]
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment protects an
individual’s privacy interest in his person, home, and belongings from
governmental intrusion when the individual has a subjective expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.37 Similarly,
courts in Canada and Europe have predicated privacy protection on a
reasonable expectation standard by using the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (“Charter”)38 and the European Convention for the
31

See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 390 (noting that European principles of
privacy “guarantee the dignity of the individuals to whom the data belong”).
32

See id. (“What these principles do offer is protection of the public persona European
citizens perceive themselves to have, protection of their image as they would like others
to see it.”).
33

See id. at 388-89 (explaining that Europe is more concerned with preserving dignity
protection among society’s members than worrying about governmental intrusion).
34

Whitman, supra note 7, at 1153 (quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477
(1968)).
35

See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7-8, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
10 [hereinafter European Charter]; Whitman, supra note 7, at 1153.
36

See Whitman, supra note 7, at 1154-55.

37

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
38

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter],
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/charter/CHART_E.pdf.
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)39 to
balance competing individual and public interests. This Article argues
that the subjective expectation of privacy in information posted to
limited-access social media websites – also described as the notion of
“network privacy”40 – is an expectation that society recognizes as
reasonable in the twenty-first century.
[6]
This Article furthers Professor Levin’s and Professor Abril’s
reasoning to conclude that judges ought to adopt a more contemporary
view of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context
of digital communication and online “communities.”41 Implementing a
more modern view is especially imperative when courts consider
questions concerning limited-access information posted to online social
media websites. Furthermore, this Article argues that European-based
privacy laws focusing on the right to a private life, viewing privacy as a
respected aid to relationship building and as a vehicle to protect personal
dignity,42 more accurately reflect the realities of the digital age and
properly protect individual privacy on the Internet. By protecting
autonomy through principles based on human dignity and recognizing that
reasonable expectations can have their place in the context of online
communities and digital communication, albeit often mediated and less
private than some forms of offline communication, privacy laws would
more effectively protect individuals and their constitutional concerns.
Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have laid the
theoretical groundwork required for heightened protection of human
dignity in online environments by espousing interpretations of reasonable
expectations of privacy that, if applied to these online situations, would
result in more protection for users posting information to OSNs.
39

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/
EnglishAnglais.pdf (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
40

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1045.

41

See generally id. at 1047 (arguing that privacy laws should change to focus more on
the contemporary and informally recognized “notion of network privacy”).
42

See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 388.
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II. DIVERGENT NOTIONS OF PRIVACY: DIGNITY, LIBERTY, OR CONTROL?
[7]
Commentators around the world have debated the proper
theoretical basis on which privacy ought to be protected.43 The two most
prevalent theories of privacy in the Western world are based on: 1) the
right to control the release of personal information, and 2) the importance
of protecting human dignity and fostering human relationships.44 Note,
however, that “that the concept of privacy is embarrassingly difficult to
define.”45 To segment privacy regimes into exclusive theoretical groups –
or even attempt to define privacy in a comparative context – requires
generalization that will not always yield wholly accurate results.46 That
being said, such a conceptual exercise provides a helpful foundation for
privacy analysis. This Article will attempt to follow some accepted
generalities about the approaches of various jurisdictions and present
conclusions based on those broad conceptions.
[8]
The European emphasis on protecting the private life has its roots
in the laws of France and Germany.47 These regimes initially sanctified
personal dignity and honor to protect the elite.48 Today, the European
Charter embodies this guarantee,49 defended by the ECHR. The European
Charter states that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable. It must be respected
43

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1007-08 (noting that privacy has been
conceptualized as the right to be “let alone,” the right to exercise “control over personal
matters or information,” or the value of “personhood, intimacy, social relationships, and
secrecy”).
44

Id. at 1008.

45

Whitman, supra note 7, at 1153.

46

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1007-08 (discussing an absence of unanimity in
privacy regimes, one conception preferred over another based on a particular society’s
“distinct historical and sociological influences, norms, and values”).
47

See id. at 1014; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214 (“The right to
privacy . . . has already found expression in the law of France.”).
48

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1013-14.

49

See European Charter, supra note 35, at art. 1.
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and protected.”50 It also provides individuals with the “right to respect for
his or her private and family life, home and communications.”51
Similarly, the ECHR establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” the
exercise of which no public authority shall interfere with except when
such “is in accordance with the law and is necessary” to protect
democratic interests of public well-being.52 This conception protects an
individual from situations where unwarranted publicity would violate
personal dignity.53 As described in a recent English decision, the law
protects an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, “even in
circumstances where there is no pre-existing relationship giving rise of
itself to an enforceable duty of confidence. . . . because the law is
concerned to prevent the violation of a citizen's autonomy, dignity, and
self-esteem.”54 As such, European jurisdictions typically grant high levels
of personal privacy protection in various areas “from consumer rights… to
discovery in civil litigation.”55
[9]
This theory of privacy protects the “inviolate personality”
conceived by Warren and Brandeis56 and, like those authors, views the
“prime enemy of our privacy . . . [as] the media, which always threatens to
broadcast unsavory information about us in ways that endanger our public
dignity.”57 Although perhaps more dominant in some jurisdictions, many
50

Id.

51

Id. at art. 7.

52

ECHR, supra note 39.

53

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1013 (describing respect for individual dignity as
the value shared by all privacy interests).
54

Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [7] (Eng.); see also
Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161.
55

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1015 (footnote omitted); see also Whitman, supra note
7, at 1156.
56

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205; see also Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at
1012.
57

Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161.
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western states also place great importance on the autonomous ability to
control personal information.58 The right to control personal information
plays a role in European law, notably manifesting itself in the right of an
individual to control his or her public image.59
[10] American privacy law, on the other hand, is based primarily on the
political value of liberty from government intrusion60 and sovereignty
within the home, rather than public image or social dignity.61 However,
American law also upholds the right to control access to and the
dissemination of personal information.62 This focus on individual liberty
to control personal information allows the individual to determine which
information to keep private and which information to release into the
public domain.63 Ideas of assumption of risk and privacy waiver have
found strong footholds in this control-based jurisprudence.64 Along with
such autonomy, this conception also “places the burden of ‘remaining
private’ squarely on the individual, who is ultimately without recourse
from existing law or technology . . . .”65 Despite the importance of
Warren and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy in American privacy law, the
United States has not yet heeded their call to protect the “inviolate
personality.”66
58

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1009.

59

See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161 (“[The German] right to informational selfdetermination [is defined as] the right to control the sorts of information disclosed about
oneself.”).
60

See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29; Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161.

61

See Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161-62.

62

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1008.

63

See id. at 1008-09.

64

See generally Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and
Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 78-80 (2007).
65

Id. at 78.

66

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205; see Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at
383.
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[11] Again, note that the distinction between liberty and dignity is not
as much black and white as it is shades of grey.67 Much crossover exists.68
Additionally, notions about predicating the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy on the amount of control exercised over personal
information in question is not without some mutual recognition.69 In the
context of OSN privacy, however, commentators have described the idea
that individual control of information is a sufficient test of the
reasonableness of the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy as
“simplistic,” “ill-fitting and impossible.”70 These commentators reason
that the test is based on “the mistaken assumption that such control is
possible on- or off-line.”71
To properly support a more ideal
contemporary conception of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy online, a healthy respect for control and liberty must be balanced
with more substantive recognition of the reputational benefits of
protecting human dignity.

67

Whitman, supra note 7, at 1162-63 (“[T]his contrast is not absolute. These are
complex societies, which are home to a variety of sensibilities, concerns, traditions, and
mutual influences. There are certainly some Americans who find the European idea of
dignity appealing. This is notably true of Justice Kennedy, whose opinion for the Court
in Lawrence v. Texas [123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003)] expresses admiration for European
approaches, and who tries energetically to found his opinion on ideals of both liberty and
dignity. For that matter, there are no doubt Europeans who find the characteristic
American approach appealing. Moreover, it is certainly the case that both forms of the
protection of privacy are in force to some extent on both sides of the Atlantic: There are
some protections against the media and the like in the United States, and there are
certainly some American tort cases protecting people's public image. As for Europe:
There are certainly some quite far-reaching protections against the state there, and there is
certainly law protecting people within the bounds of the home.” (footnotes omitted)).
68

See id.

69

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1009; Abril, supra note 64, at 76 (claiming that
those who view their online existence as their own personal space, the “digital natives,”
are more likely to feel violated by Internet privacy breaches than their less “cyber-savvy”
counterparts, the “digital immigrants”).
70

Abril, supra note 64, at 78.

71

Id.
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III. CHANGING EXPECTATIONS IN THE WORLD OF
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
[12] Commentators have noticed the dichotomy between traditional
privacy law – at least in those jurisdictions that base privacy on the ideals
of liberty and the right to control information – and recent trends emerging
in online communities.72 Commentators call the dichotomy a “privacy
contradiction” because “users of social networking websites tend to
disclose much personal information online, yet they seem to retain an
expectation of privacy.”73 Under traditional views of privacy and the
Internet – held by those whom Professor Palfrey calls “digital
immigrants”74 – there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything
posted anywhere on the Internet.75 Indeed, recent judicial decisions have
echoed these views,76 and have also made quite a stir in online chatter.77
Some call the distinction between “digital immigrants” and “digital
natives”78 “the greatest generation gap since the early days of rock and
roll.”79
72

See, e.g., Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002; John G. Palfrey, Jr., Commentary,
Should Fred Hire Mimi Despite Her Online History?, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at 42
(describing the recent trend of revealing “compromising photos [and] embarrassing
conversations” online, despite the fact many people would likely deem such information
highly private).
73

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.

74

Palfrey, supra note 72, at 42.

75

See Abril, supra note 64, at 77 (“To the digital immigrant, [online social network]
privacy is an absurd oxymoron.”).
76

See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862-63 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009); Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 18-19, 32, 36 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.) (WL); Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, paras. 1, 4, 17, 19, 20 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
77

See, e.g., Digital Immigrant, URBANDICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/
define.php?term=digital+immigrant (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (discussing how by the
time this was written, the phrase “digital immigrant” has received more than 3,500 votes
and comments on the popular website).
78
Palfrey, supra note 72.
79

Abril, supra note 64, at 73.
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[13] Commentators have noted, “online social networking poses a
fundamental challenge to the theory of privacy as control.”80 The stakes
have been raised because digital technologies lack “the relative transience
of human memory,”81 and can be trolled or data mined for information in
ways previously unthinkable.82 Digital dossiers contain growing amounts
of information from all over the Internet that can result in real world
harm.83 Admittedly, many new technologies may provide a greater ability
to control how, where, and when we publish our private information, if we
do so at all.84 However, the nature of the growing participatory Internet
poses a greater risk that online socializers will post “unflattering,
defamatory, or personal information about each other, and that this
information would in turn be available to a large, if not unrestricted, online
audience.”85 The Internet and OSNs allow third parties the luxury of
broadcasting other people’s personal information to large audiences much
more easily than through older, more established, modes of
communication that existed throughout much of privacy law’s
development.86 Some have expressed the view that this change will have
profound effects on the concept of reputation in the years to come.87

80

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002.

81

Abril, supra note 64, at 75.

82

See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 57
(1999).
83

See id. (“A person’s digital dossier can betray him in the physical world, resulting in
harms like the denial or loss of employment, shame and embarrassment, denigration of
reputation, or merely exposure in an unwanted light.” (footnote omitted)); see also
SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 2-3.
84

Cf. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 223 (describing how digital dossiers will affect individual
freedom and power).
85

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002.

86

See id. at 1006-07.

87

See id. See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 2-4 (2007).
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[14] The other side of the coin concerns the release of one’s own
personal information onto the Internet. This information is often not
released to the public at large but, in many instances, to large numbers of
“friends” on a user’s MySpace or Facebook profile.88 Some courts have
begun to take the view that this release of information to a large number of
friends is essentially the same as releasing it to the public at large, despite
the user’s subjective expectation to the contrary.89 Strictly tying the
reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy to ideas of control
and waiver, relevant in the traditional offline context, neglects to consider
whether the subjective expectations of the Internet community, a
substantial and growing percentage of our society, ought to be afforded
greater weight – perhaps even considered reasonable in certain
circumstances.90
Granted, completely disregarding the connection
between control, waiver through releasing information, and the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in that information would
prove foolhardy.91 However, courts may more satisfactorily address this
paradox by reading an element of human dignity – such as that found in
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights – into the
theoretical basis for protecting privacy in information posted to OSNs.92
[15] Professors Levin and Abril recently published the results of an
empirical study in which they examined the OSN activity and privacy
expectations of 2,500 students in the United States and Canada.93 After
reviewing the results of the study, the professors outlined a “theory of

88

See Statistics, supra note 16 (“[the] [a]verage user has 130 friends.”).

89

See, e.g., Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(WL) (equating a private or limited access Facebook profile with a public profile);
Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 20 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL))
(discussing how 366 friends negated any expectation of privacy).
90

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1046.

91

See id. at 1046-47.

92

See id. at 1014-15, 1047.

93

See id. at 1004-05.
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network privacy”94 which supported their conclusion that these “online
socializers have developed a new and arguably legitimate notion of
privacy online . . . .”95 Their conclusion draws a clear parallel with the
aims of this Article; specifically, that this notion of network privacy, if
respected, would “offer online socializers both control and protection of
their dignity and reputation.”96 Their work recognizes the link between
the degree of control over personal information and the amount of privacy
protection afforded such information.97 Indeed, many of the leading OSNs
have themselves propagated this “notion of privacy as user control.”98 An
older version of Facebook’s privacy policy (as of Nov. 10, 2009) stated as
its two core principles: “(1) You should have control over your personal
information, and (2) You should have access to the information others
want to share.”99 This ability of others to share information is precisely
the thorn in the side of the control theory.100
[16] According to the results of Levin’s and Abril’s study, a majority of
OSN users reported that their profiles included “their real full name, home
town, high school, relationship status, interests, hobbies, favorite music,
books, movies, and a picture of themselves.”101 More than three fourths
94

Id. at 1045.

95

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002.

96

Id.

97

See id. at 1005.

98

Id. at 1005-06.

99

Id. (quoting Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoted material since removed
from site); see also Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php
(last modified Dec. 22, 2010) (describing the control settings for personal information);
Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy
(last modified Feb. 28, 2008) (suggesting that user control over personal information is
part of its core).
100

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1006-07.

101

Id. at 1024.
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reported posting real photographs of themselves, and only a small
minority reported posting fake names or photos.102 Nearly half the
respondents reported serious concerns about strangers accessing their
profiles.103 The respondents demonstrated selectivity in the type of
material they posted and, reportedly, were “able to distinguish between
personal information that allows them to socialize safely with other users
. . . and information that could be potentially dangerous . . . .”104
[17] According to the study, seventy-two percent of respondents
manually restricted their privacy settings and more than half blocked
specific people from viewing their profiles.105 More than sixty percent
believed they take effective measures to protect their privacy, but many
felt helpless protecting their character or controlling what information
others post about them.106 Levin and Abril concluded that these results
“illustrate[] the difficulty of combining control-oriented privacy protection
tools and policies with dignity-based concerns in a coherent manner. The
domination of control-oriented tools leads to the dismissal of dignity
concerns, while the emergence of such concerns reinforces uncertainty
about the efficacy of such tools.”107 The study also found that similar
percentages of respondents harbored concerns about controlling their
information (thirty-seven percent), and many held concerns specifically
directed toward the dignitary ends of protecting reputation and
relationships (thirty-two percent).108 Most respondents felt strongly in
favor of the ability to segregate the professional and personal segments of
their lives through OSN privacy settings, such as by not allowing profile

102

See Id.

103

Id. at 1026.

104

Id. at 1025.

105

Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1033.

106

Id. at 1036.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1038-39.
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access to employers109 or parents.110 In sum, many online socializers do
maintain subjective expectations of privacy – “grounded in the need to
maintain discreet social identities, or situational personalities”111 – in
information uploaded to OSN profiles despite their “penchant for
disclosure.”112 Levin and Abril’s notion of “network privacy,” is therefore
“a notion of privacy based on the expected accessibility of personal
information to social constituencies.”113 These online socializers are more
concerned with who views their information and how it is disseminated,
rather than whether this information is disseminated in the first place.114
[18] Granted, determining whether an individual maintains a subjective
expectation of privacy in his or her OSN profile information cannot
always be “scientifically gauged.”115 In fact, “the inherent nature” of the
activity of utilizing an OSN itself often “works against any notion of an
expectation of privacy.”116 By signing up, logging in, and posting
information, the user has shown clear intention “to publicize [the]
information to others.”117 These actions show clearer intention to
disseminate personal information than in the case of an e-mail or
telephone call because of the typical number of recipients.118 Therefore,
OSN profile information appears similar to a “yearbook, directory, or
bulletin board,” where “users are communicating information for more
109

See id. at 1026, 1043.

110

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1025-26.

111

Id. at 1045.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

See id. at 1045-46.

115

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).

116

Hodge, supra note 19, at 106.

117

Id.

118

See Statistics, supra note 16.
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than one person by posting that information on a naturally public
platform.”119 However, the fact that a person has acted to prevent public
access to such information – by selecting privacy settings that limit access
to those recognized as “friends”120 – suggests that such analogies go too
far. A “mass e-mail,” available only to the intended recipients who must
login to their respective inboxes to access the information, may provide a
more proper analogy.121 Obvious in the context of recent decisions, the
individual still must fight an uphill battle to show that he or she retained
some subjective expectation of privacy in information made available to
hundreds – or perhaps thousands – of people.122 However, the existence
of this subjective expectation of privacy actually exists in large numbers
of OSN users.123 It resides at a generational divide of serious depth and
consequence.124
[19] Those who have grown up with the Internet, particularly the recent
interactive rise of web 2.0,125 view online privacy in a very different way
than those of previous generations who have – or have not – immigrated to
it.126 Younger “natives” expect technological barriers – whether real or
119

Hodge, supra note 19, at 107.

120

See id. at 110; see also Privacy Policy, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/
policy.php (last revised Dec. 22, 2010).
121

See U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 412 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“Messages sent to the public
at large in the ‘chat room’ or e-mail that is ‘forwarded’ from correspondent to
correspondent lose any semblance of privacy.”); Hodge, supra note 19, at 110 n.110
(“Courts have, however, hinted that an e-mail forwarded to more than one person would
not be private. A mass e-mail is not, though, forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent, but instead is delivered once to many correspondents.” (citation omitted)).
122

See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding
that plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information published on
social network web sites).
123

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1045-46.

124

See id. at 1017-18.

125

See Matthew J. Wilson, E-Elections: Time for Japan to Embrace Online
Campaigning, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, at *1.
126

See Abril, supra note 64, at 76.
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merely imagined – to protect their information from unintended
audiences,127 while others view their actions as reckless and foolish.128
One commentator has described this predicament as follows:
To the digital immigrant, OSN privacy is an absurd
oxymoron. After all, it’s the Internet! When faced with
the privacy-related risks of the medium, digital immigrants
fervently argue, “if you can’t stand the heat, get off of
MySpace.” This argument is consistent with their history
of control over their personal information and the
control-centered definitions of privacy of their generation’s
noted legal scholars.129
However, to simply place all things Internet into a basket reserved for only
completely public information would seriously undermine the actual
subjective – and arguably reasonable – expectations of a large and
growing segment of society, ignore the technological protection measures
actually available, and lead to an increasing number of unsalvageable real
world harms stemming from the technology’s use.130 In short, that
approach would refuse to adapt legal protection to a changing world.131 In
this new world, OSNs remain increasingly at the center of the online
development of personal identity; they replace and supplement their
physical real-world counterparts from days past, such as malls or
drive-ins.132 Affording privacy to the development of personality,
identity, and the flowering of relationships would protect “[the] crucial

127

See id.; Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1033-34.

128

See Abril, supra note 64, at 76; Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.

129

Abril, supra note 64, at 77 (citing Fried, supra note 34, at 482; ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)).
130

See generally id. at 86-87.

131

See id. at 78 (“[P]rivacy law, technology, and ethics have not caught up to the harms
they purportedly protect and redress.”).
132

See id. at 83.
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developmental purpose”133 of OSNs and relates to some of the explicitly
defined purposes of ECHR-type private life protections based on a respect
for human dignity.134
IV. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY UNDER US TORT LAWS
[20] Tort law in many U.S. states recognizes various rights to
privacy.135 These state laws often utilize tests to determine the
reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy.136 Many states
provide remedies for invasions of privacy that resemble the four main
privacy torts Prosser identified in 1960.137 Prosser concluded that these
torts consisted of: “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion . . . (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts . . . (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light . . . and (4) appropriation, for the
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”138 These torts
came to life in response to the very thing of which Warren and Brandeis
had warned: privacy violations of the traditional print media.139 The four
torts Prosser defined, however, do not necessarily adapt well to privacy
crises in cyberspace.140

133

See id. (citing Danah Boyd, Address at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science: Identity Production in a Networked Culture: Why Youth Heart
MySpace (Feb. 19, 2006), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/AAAS2006.html).
134

See discussion infra Part VII (pertaining to ECHR Article 8’s private life
jurisprudence).
135

See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 58.

136

See id. at 59-60 (showing that a commonly used test of an individual’s expectation of
privacy is whether the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person”).
137

See Prosser, supra note 2; SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 58.

138

Prosser, supra note 2.

139

SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 58.

140

Id. at 58-59; Abril, supra note 64, at 78-81.
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[21] The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects “‘private affairs or
concerns’” from intrusion that “‘would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.’”141 It does not protect private matters kept in anything but
non-public places, and, as the Internet is seen primarily as a public
medium, this tort does not currently provide adequate protection for
information on the Internet.142 Prosser’s second tort, publication of private
facts, typically provides a remedy to an individual when a private matter –
not of legitimate public concern – is broadcast to a wide audience in a way
that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”143 The tort does not
provide effective remedies for violations of privacy not subject to wide
dissemination or not highly offensive.144 Additionally, the last two torts,
false light and appropriation, are closely linked with defamation and
intellectual property laws, respectively,145 and have limited applicability to
invasions of privacy in the context of the information technology issues
this Article confronts. A state-by-state analysis of privacy related tort law
is well outside the scope of this Article. However, one recent California
case is relevant to the current discussion and, quite fittingly, portrays a
foreboding portrait of the privacy problems inherent at the intersection of
the print media and the new medium of the Internet.146
[22] In Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, the plaintiff, a U.C. Berkeley
student, wrote a scathing ode to her central California hometown of
Coalinga and published it to her MySpace page.147 The post began by
stating, “the older I get, the more I realize how much I despise Coalinga”

141

SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 59 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1976).
142

See id.

143

Id.

144

See id at 59-60.

145

See id. at 60.

146

See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).

147

See id. at 861.
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and went on to comment negatively about the town and its inhabitants.148
The post was only available on Moreno’s MySpace page for six days
before she took it down.149 However, within that time, the local high
school principal located it and forwarded it to the editor of the town
newspaper who – without notifying or seeking permission from Moreno –
subsequently published it in the paper’s “Letters to the Editor” section,
attributing it as a submission from Moreno.150 As a result, Moreno’s
family in Coalinga received death threats and a gunshot was fired at the
family’s home.151 Because of the community’s violent reaction, the
family moved away from Coalinga and closed their twenty-year-old
family business.152 Moreno and her family sued the paper for invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the court
dismissed the privacy claim on demurrer, prior to any trial on the
merits.153
[23] California privacy law – part of the state’s constitutional law –
largely mirrors Prosser’s four privacy torts.154 It allows remedies for four
distinct types of harm: “(1) intrusion into private matters; (2) public
disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity placing a person in a false light;
and (4) misappropriation of a person's name or likeness.”155 To succeed
on an invasion of privacy claim, the party must demonstrate: “(1) a legally
protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under
the circumstances; and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.”156 In
148

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861.

153

Id. at 860-61.

154

Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Atheltic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994).

155

Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.

156

Id. (citations omitted).
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Moreno, the court held that postings on publically accessible MySpace
pages were not private, and as such, the plaintiff could not hold a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information published to her
profile.157 “Under these circumstances,” the court stated, “no reasonable
person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published
material.”158 The court made clear that it did not require total secrecy, but
that by publishing the ode on a fully public page, Moreno had failed to
“define [her] circle of intimacy,”159 despite expecting that only a limited
audience would view her page.160 In concluding Moreno maintained no
objective expectation of privacy in her MySpace post, the court stated,
“[b]y posting the article on myspace.com, [Moreno] opened the article to
the public at large. Her potential audience was vast.”161 A number of
courts have begun to come to similar conclusions.162

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id. (quoting M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Cal. Ct. App
2001)).
160

Id. at 863.

161

Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863 (emphasis added).

162

See, e.g., Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, No. 06-5337 (FSH),
2007 WL 7393489, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007) (discussing online journals and diary
entries of minors, the court stated, "[t]he privacy concerns are far less where the
beneficiary herself chose to disclose the information"); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and
MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information would be
shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature
and purpose of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist.”); Dexter v
Dexter, No. 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 n.4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2007)
(stating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding Myspace writings
open to public view).
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V. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN DIGITAL
COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE US FOURTH AMENDMENT
[24] The United States Constitution, while not explicitly mentioning a
right to privacy, does protect some elements of privacy.163 The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits some forms of
governmental intrusion into an individual’s private life – specifically,
“unreasonable searches and seizures” – unless a valid warrant adequately
authorizes such an intrusion.164 It only protects against searches where a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists.165 It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.166
The Fifth Amendment, by comparison, prohibits the government from
forcing an individual to incriminate himself.167 At one point, these
constitutional amendments together barred government from “any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his
163

A right to privacy, for example, has been found within the penumbra of rights granted
by the Bill of Rights, and has been articulated in cases involving contraception, abortion,
and information – including an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of private
matters. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 64-65; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605
(1977) (finding a right of privacy in personal information collected by government
agencies); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the right of personal
privacy includes abortion decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (finding that use of contraceptives lies within the zone of privacy created by
fundamental constitutional gurantees).
164

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

165

SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 188-89.

166

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

167

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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goods,” because such compulsion is an “invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property.”168 However,
the court subsequently backed away from that position in later opinions.169
Some scholars have argued that the Fourth Amendment focus on privacy
is misguided and “has not fared well with the changing times.”170 Others
argue that such a focus remains vitally important. In fact, “the Court’s
failure to conceptualize privacy adequately” has given rise to many of the
problems confronting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the information
age.171
[25] In Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis wrote a passionate
dissent, arguing, much in line with arguments made in his seminal article
of 1890,172 that, by not finding police wire tapping an unreasonable search,
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence failed to properly reflect
changing societal conditions.173 Brandeis wrote, “[c]lauses guaranteeing
to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a
similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”174 Thirty-nine years
later, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted Justice
Brandeis’s view175 and, through an influential concurrence by Justice
168

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 63.

169

See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 63-64; see, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967) (overturning the mere evidence rule); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1948) (explaining the Fifth Amendment does not bar
production of an individual’s records as incriminating evidence).
170

SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 190 (quoting Scott E. Sundby, ‘Everyman’s’ Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1751, 1771 (1994)).
171

Id. at 190-91.

172

See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198.

173

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Hodge, supra note 19, at 100.
174

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

175

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
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Harlan, articulated a new two-step approach to determine the
reasonableness of government action under the Fourth Amendment.176
First, a person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy.”177 Second, that subjective expectation must “be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”178 In Katz, as well as in Berger
v. New York, decided earlier that same year, the Supreme Court held that
government eavesdropping on an individual’s telephone conversation
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, violated
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.179 The caller, stated
the Katz court, “is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world,”180 and therefore retains
a privacy right in the conversation.181
[26] Essentially, to implicate a Fourth Amendment violation, a
subjective expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable.182
Exceptions do exist, of course, and include police searches in “hot
pursuit,”183 protective sweeps of cars,184 limited stops and frisks based on
reasonable suspicion,185 searches incident to a lawful arrest186 and, in
176

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring); Hodge, supra note 19, at 100.

177

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).

178

Id. (emphasis added).

179

See Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967); Katz, 389 U.S. at 359; see also
Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th
Cir. 2008).
180

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.

181

Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352).

182

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 101.

183

See Warden, 387 U.S. at 310.

184

See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982).

185

See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 189 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968)).

186

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
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certain circumstances, searches of electronic communications stored for
more than 180 days187 – although the constitutionality of this statutory
provision has been questioned.188 This subjective determination is “an
empirical question which fact finders decide using the evidence from each
individual case.”189 The test laid out in Katz operates in the context of
protecting an individual’s expectation of privacy in his telephone
communications.190 Logically, some lower courts have extended it to
encompass communication in a digital context,191 although some lower
court judges have not been keen to apply analogies developed in the
physical world to an electronic one.192 However, in 2010, the Supreme
Court finally weighed in on the issue, in City of Ontario v. Quon.193
[27] In Quon, the Supreme Court held that a public employer’s detailed
search of a police officer’s pager text messages was ultimately reasonable
because it was “motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose,” “was not
187

Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).

188

See generally Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2007)
vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
189

Hodge, supra note 19, at 101; see Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing
Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1591,
1596 n.55 (1997).
190

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).

191

See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (“So
long as the risk-analysis approach of Katz remains valid, however, this court is compelled
to apply traditional legal principles to this new and continually evolving technology.”),
aff’d 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000).
192

See, e.g., United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The advent of
the electronic age and . . . the development of desktop computers . . . go beyond the
established categories of constitutional doctrine. Analogies to other physical objects,
such as dressers or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we now face as judges
when applying search and seizure law.” (footnote omitted)); Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at
508 (“Cyberspace is a nonphysical ‘place’ and its very structure, a computer and
telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis.”); see also Hodge, supra note 19, at 102.
193

See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010).
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excessive in scope,” and would likely be “‘regarded as reasonable and
normal in the private-employer context.’”194
The Ontario Police
Department searched transcripts of Quon’s pager messages – after Quon
surpassed his monthly character allotment – to determine whether the
excess resulted from work related messaging (implying the department’s
character limit was too low) or private communication.195 When Quon’s
employer discovered the sexually explicit, non-work related nature of the
text messages, his supervisor referred the matter to the department’s
internal affairs division, which ultimately disciplined Quon for his
conduct.196 Quon sued on Fourth Amendment grounds, claiming the
search was unreasonable, but the United States Supreme Court
disagreed.197 Before making its pronouncement, however, the court
stated, “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society
has become clear.”198 Assuming Quon indeed “had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in [his] text messages,” the court analogized the
search to one involving “a government employer’s search of an
employee’s physical office” space, and found the invasion justified.199
[28] In the landmark case of Smith v. Maryland, the United States
Supreme Court held an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
cannot extend to non-substantive information – such as the numbers
dialed – gathered by devices such as pen registers because, unlike the
eavesdropping in Katz and Berger, “pen registers do not acquire the
contents of communications.”200 The court’s holding rested on the
194

Id. at 2632-33.

195

See id. at 2625-26.

196

Id. at 2626.

197

See id. at 2626, 2632.

198

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.

199

Id. at 2630.

200

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); see Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d
455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); Hodge, supra note 19, at
103.
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premise that “[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone
numbers to the telephone company” because their monthly bills reflect
these numbers.201 Although discarding the possibility of any objective
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s claim, the Court also held that “even if
petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers
he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not ‘one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”202
[29] The Smith decision allowed the government to acquire non-content
information derived from the register, namely the numbers the customer
dials,203 but continued to protect the contents of the individual’s
communication. Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, argued that an
expectation of privacy in the communication’s contents remains
reasonable even though “[t]he telephone conversation itself must be
electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be
recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment.”204
However, United States v. Miller put this proposition to the test when
Justice Powell – invoking the concept that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties”205 – wrote that when a party discloses information to another he
“takes the risk . . . that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government.”206 The court has applied this assumption of risk
exception in a variety of contexts to defeat Fourth Amendment claims,207
201

Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Hodge, supra note 19, at 103.

202

Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.s. at 361) ; accord Hodge, supra note 19,
at 103.
203

Accord Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470; see Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42.

204

Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

205

Id. at 743–44.

206

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).

207

See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“[W]hen an individual
reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit governmental use of that information.”); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,
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and the Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen reiterated the
exception eight years after the Miller decision.208 Therefore, no
reasonable expectation of privacy can exist in regard to the actions of
other parties to the communication and, potentially, to information
channelled through an intermediary.
[30] Obviously, Smith, Miller, and Jacobsen stand strongly for the
proposition that society, at least in the late 1970s and mid 1980s, was not
prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in some types of
personal information, especially in non-content information shared with
third parties.209 In contrast, however, Congress and many state courts
have taken a different view.210 Congress enacted legislation that partially
superseded both Smith and Miller,211 and many state courts have rejected
those holdings in favor of broader privacy rights based on state
constitutional provisions.212
419 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that the sender of an e-mail runs the risk that its recipient
will publish the contents); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980)
(noting the assumption of risk exception through information contained in records
entrusted to a bank officer); Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (noting the assumption of risk
exception through customer's bank records); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750
(1971) (noting the assumption of risk exception through confidences exchanged in
private conversation); United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. Ct.
2007) (“[T]here can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in matters voluntarily
disclosed or entrusted to third parties, even those disclosed to a person with whom one
has a confidential business relationship.”).
208

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.

209

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 103; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; Miller, 425 U.S. at
442-43. See generally Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (holding that a party assumes the risk
that information will be disclosed to the government when it is voluntarily provided to a
third party).
210

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 103-04.

211

See 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (2006) (“A Government authority may obtain financial records .
. . only if [the records] . . . are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry . . . [and
if] a copy of the summons has been served on the customer . . . .”); see also 18 U.S.C. §
3121 (2006) (stating that most pen registers may only be used with a court order).
212

Hodge, supra note 19, at 104 (citing Frances A. Gilligan & Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Cyberspace: The Newest Challenge for Traditional Legal Doctrine, 24 RUTGERS
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[31] An additional exception has also been applied in circumstances
where a private party infringes upon the privacy of the individual prior to
any government action.213 In this situation, the police can piggyback onto
the private party’s breach without causing additional harm to an already
frustrated expectation of privacy, thus avoiding a Fourth Amendment
violation.214 The police can also conduct a more thorough or intensive
search without violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy
interest “so long as they do not ‘significantly expand’ upon or ‘change the
nature’ of the underlying private search.”215 Courts have applied this
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 305, 330–31 (1998) (“There is a parallel between Miller and
Smith: Both cases have been rejected by state courts . . .”)); see, e.g., Charnes v.
Digiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); People v. Jackson, 452
N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-18 (Utah
1991).
213

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.

214

See id. at 117; United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
2007) (“Where the State is simply the passive recipient of evidence gathered by a private
party acting without the State's instigation or direction, a defendant incriminated by that
evidence has no recourse to the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489-90 (1971) (holding that the government did not violate
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right by seizing guns voluntarily given to them by
defendant’s wife); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003)
(upholding evidence of a vigilante computer hacker who provided authorities with digital
images of the defendant engaging in sexual activity with a child); United States v.
Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding government’s use of
photocopied materials the defendant's employee secretly made and mailed to the FBI);
United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1987) (approving the
government’s use of incriminating documents supplied by a disgruntled employee that
implicated her supervisor in a crime); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 400-01 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (upholding conviction based on pornography discovered by a curious freight
agent who opened a package without the defendant’s authorization); Ward v. State, 351
A.2d 452, 454-55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (allowing incriminating evidence provided
by defendant’s daughter who gave it to the police without his permission or knowledge).
215

D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (quoting United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449,
452 (5th Cir. 2001)); see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115 ("The additional invasions of [a
defendant's] privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they
exceeded the scope of the private search."); see also Paul v. State, 57 P.3d 698, 702-03
(Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (holding that police did not intrude on any Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy by reviewing the entirety of an obscene videotape that had been
partially viewed by a private citizen).
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exception recently in circumstances where an anonymous caller had given
authorities password and username information related to another
individual’s online photo storage and a government agent used the
information to search the directory and locate incriminating photographs
of criminal behavior.216
A. No Expectations of Privacy in Non-Content Data
[32] Federal and State courts have begun to apply this Supreme Court
precedent in the context of digital communication and Internet activity.217
Interestingly, although not unexpectedly, one District Court observed in
2007 that “[t]he Smith line of cases has led federal courts to uniformly
conclude that internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
their subscriber information, the length of their stored files, and other
non-content data to which service providers must have access.”218
B. Expectations of Privacy in the Content of Digital Communication
[33] One district court recently ruled that it was “obvious that a claim to
privacy is unavailable to someone who places information on an
indisputably, public medium, such as the Internet, without taking any
216

See D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. at 122.

217

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 101.

218

D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 120; see Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.
2001) (holding that a user loses any expectation of privacy in personal subscription
information when it is conveyed to a system operator); United States v. Cox, 190 F.
Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[C]riminal defendants have no Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in subscriber information given to an internet service provider.”); see
also United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) ("Congress
clearly intended for suppression not to be an option for a defendant whose electronic
communications have been intercepted in violation of [the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act]."), aff’d, 106 Fed. Appx. 688 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gines-Perez,
214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) vacated on other grounds by, 90 Fed. Appx. 3
(1st Cir. 2004); BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78481, at *14 (D.C.S.C.
2007) (holding plaintiffs cannot complain that an authorized photo on the Internet was
linked to by a blogger in a negative blog post); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d
504, 509 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000).
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measures to protect the information.”219 Continuing, the court stated, “[a]
person who places information on the information superhighway clearly
subjects said information to being accessed by every conceivable
interested party. Simply expressed, if privacy is sought, then public
communication mediums such as the Internet are not adequate forums
without protective measures.”220 The court, therefore, declared that
society was not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a photograph on the Internet.221 The Court further stated,
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights
to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as
here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to
the Web page or the photograph itself.222
This reasoning seems in line with Fourth Amendment law surrounding the
plain view doctrine.223 When obviously incriminating information is
visible from a publicly accessible place, therefore, in plain view, police
may seize the evidence without requiring a warrant.224 Placing an item in
plain view necessarily waives any reasonable expectation of privacy.225
However, the court did not stop its reasoning there. Disturbingly, the
court also said, “placing information on the information superhighway
necessarily makes said matter accessible to the public, no matter how
219

Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.

220

Id.

221

Id.

222

Id.

223

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).

224

See id. (discussing how under the plain view doctrine, “objects, activities, or
statements that [one] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because
no intention to keep them to [oneself] has been exhibited”); see also Hodge, supra note
19, at 109.
225

See Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
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many protectionist measures may be taken . . . .”226 This Author, among
others, believes that such a statement goes too far.
[34] Professor Warren LaFave, a preeminent authority on Fourth
Amendment law, has argued that an individual should rightfully claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a webpage if the
individual safeguards those contents through password protection.227 This
argument points out a crucial difference between content and non-content
data, suggesting that assumption of risk does not defeat this expectation in
webpage privacy because,
[W]hile a service provider has a need to access information
regarding the identity of a site holder and the volume and
extent of her usage, it has no legitimate reason to inspect
the actual contents of the site, anymore than the postal
service has a legitimate interest in reading the contents of
first class mail, or a telephone company has a legitimate
interest in listening to a customer's conversations.228
In this vein, Professor LaFave has argued that “‘[r]eliance on protections
such an[sic] individual computer accounts, password protection, and
perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon
locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of protection is

226

Id. (emphasis added).

227

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 721 (4th ed. 2004); see D'Andrea v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117,
121 (D. Mass. Ct. 2007).
228

D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 121. But see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th
Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the possibility that the "Good Samaritan" provision of the
Communication Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c), might not have preemptive
effect on a state law, thereby imposing a duty on ISP providers to filter offensive content
on hosted websites); see also Id. at 122 (discussing how LaFave’s argument, that a
service provider has no legitimate reason to monitor the contents of an Internet site, may
not be as rock solid as it appears).
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penetrable.’”229 This reasoning would provide a greater expectation of
privacy in password protected or limited-access social networking
profiles. The greatest problem with social networking profiles that are
open to numerous “friends” would then lie in the risk that one of these
“friends” would pass the information along to the government.
[35] However, the decision discussed above is not the only one to reject
the idea that e-mail and Internet communication can enjoy reasonable
expectations of privacy.230 One district court stated that, “while
individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, in their home computers, they do not enjoy
such an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the internet or in
e-mail which has already arrived at the recipient.”231 However, properly
understood, this rule should apply only to the actions of the recipient, not
to any unrelated subsequent search or seizure merely by virtue of the
communication reaching its recipient.

229

LAFAVE, supra note 227 (footnote omitted) (quoting Randolph S. Sergeant, Note, A
Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV.
1189, 1200 (1995); accord D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
230

See Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26 (explaining that defendant had no
subjective expectation of privacy in photograph placed on the public medium of the
Internet, society was not prepared to recognize as reasonable any expectation of privacy
in information placed on Internet, and the picture was obviously placed on website for
commercial purposes); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1045
(9th Cir. 2001) (“No expectation of privacy attaches to electronic communications made
available through facilities readily available to the public . . . .”); United States v.
Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is
no legitimate expectation of privacy in non-content customer information provided to an
ISP by one of its customers)); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 220 F. Supp. 2d
4, 13 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002) (holding web-monitoring company's conduct in intercepting
Internet users' electronic communications with various health-related and medical-related
Internet websites and sharing of private information about their web browsing habits and
confidential health information with defendant pharmaceutical companies fell under the
exception from liability under the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Act).
231

United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing United
States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
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C. Privacy in E-mail and Other Electronic Communication
[36] In deciding cases involving e-mail privacy and whether the use of
electronically mediated communication technologies constitutes a waiver
of privacy rights, courts have tended to analogize e-mail to more
traditional types of communication, such as letters or telephone calls,232
although, as mentioned above, not all judges have been apt to follow this
course.233 Courts have also relied on the privacy policies and terms of use
propagated by the Internet Service Providers in question,234 as well as the
identity of the recipient.235 Intermediaries, usually an Internet Service
Provider (“ISP”), transmit and deliver e-mails like letters or telephone
calls, so such analogies appear to be well grounded and highly relevant to
the waiver issue.236 As such, the law ought to apply to e-mail, and other
forms of private mediated electronic communication, in much the same
way as it has to its offline counterparts. Indeed, a number of courts have
held that, by default, individuals have legitimate privacy interests in their
e-mail and computer files, despite the use of an intermediary.237

232

See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see also Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
233

See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The advent of the
electronic age and . . . the development of desktop computers . . . go beyond the
established categories of constitutional doctrine. Analogies to other physical objects, such
as dressers or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we now face as judges
when applying search and seizure law.”); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504,
508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (“Cyberspace is a nonphysical ‘place’ and its very structure, a
computer and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis.”), aff’d 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. 2000). See generally Hodge,
supra note 19, at 102.
234

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 104-05 (citing Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417).

235

United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“The
expectations of privacy in e-mail transmissions depend in large part on both the type of email sent and recipient of the e-mail.”).
236

Id.

237

See id. at 1184.
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[37] Additionally, this reasonable expectation applies to communication
sent from government or work computers.238 Problems arise, however,
when the intermediary has a policy of monitoring communications sent
through its service.239 In these cases, the individual waives his or her
expectation of privacy as a condition of using the service in question.240
Potentially, a large number of recipients might also diminish an otherwise
reasonable expectation of privacy.241 This potential caveat is especially
relevant in the context of OSNs, such as Facebook and MySpace, where
large numbers of friends may view even limited-access profiles.242
However, there is a difference between electronic communications
intended for public consumption, or at least visible to the public at large,
and those limited to access by a specifically delineated group.243 As such,
postings to publically accessible websites,244 chat rooms,245 electronic
238

See, e.g., United States v. Long, 61 M.J. 539, 543-44 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).

239

See United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating that an
individual lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails sent on the Air Force
system, where a specific notice was given that persons logging on to the system
consented to monitoring); Hodge, supra note 17, at 105-06; see also United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in electronic files on his office computer because of employment
policies that explicitly authorized the employer to “audit, inspect, and/or monitor” such
files).
240

See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398.

241

Hodge, supra note 19, at 105 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419
(C.A.A.F. 1996)).
242

See Kevin Lewis et al., The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy
Settings in an Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 79, 81 (2008).
243

See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he public
disclosure of material to an untold number of readers distinguishes bulletin board
postings from e-mails, which typically have a limited, select number of recipients.”),
vacated, 532 F.3d 521, (6th Cir. 2008).
244

See United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) (holding
that there is no expectation of privacy when posting a photo on publically available
website).
245

See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
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bulletin boards,246 and social network profiles,247 essentially merit no such
expectation of privacy.
[38] In Warshak v. United States, the Sixth Circuit analogized the
Supreme Court precedent in Katz, Smith, and Miller to situations involving
e-mail communications.248 The court recognized that, as Katz pointed out,
“the mere fact that a communication is shared with another person does
not entirely erode all expectations of privacy . . . .”249 In situations of
shared communication, courts should differentiate between those parties
with whom the individual shares the communication and those from whom
the individual shields the communication.250 Despite the fact that a person
assumes the risk that those with whom he communicates will reveal the
information to the government,
The same does not necessarily apply, however, to an
intermediary that merely has the ability to access the
information sought by the government. Otherwise phone
conversations would never be protected, merely because
the telephone company can access them; letters would
never be protected, by virtue of the Postal Service’s ability
to access them; the contents of shared safe deposit boxes or
storage lockers would never be protected, by virtue of the
bank or storage company’s ability to access them.251
Courts limit this expectation of privacy in the information stored by the
intermediary, however, to the content of the communication, as set out in
Smith.252 The Warshak court held that,
246

See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).

247

See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).

248

Warshak, 490 F.3d at 469-70.

249

Id. at 470.

250

Id.

251

Id.

252

See id. at 471.
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[A]lthough the government can compel disclosure of a
shared communication from the party with whom it was
shared, it can only compel disclosure of the specific
information to which the subject of its compulsion has been
granted access. It cannot, on the other hand, bootstrap an
intermediary’s limited access to one part of the
communication (e.g. the phone number) to allow it access
to another part (the content of the conversation).253
Under this analysis, compelled disclosure of subscriber information and
related non-content information from an individual’s ISP would not
violate the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests under the authority of
Smith and Miller.254 In contrast, “there is a societal expectation that the
ISP or the phone company” will not reveal the contents of the
communication “as a matter of course.”255 Indeed, the major OSNs and
many other ISPs include this in their privacy policies.256
The
government’s subpoena of the content of the communication from the
recipient of the e-mail – or the “friend” in the OSN context – however,
would not infringe on the individual’s interests because of the individual’s
assumption of that risk.257 This risk does not necessarily extend to the
intermediate storage of the information, but it arises only after the final
recipient has accessed the e-mail.258 Additionally, the USA-PATRIOT
Act259 enlarged the definition of a pen register to include “addressing
253

Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471.

254

See id.

255

Id.

256

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 119.

257

See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471; SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 204-05 (noting the
Department of Justice has interpreted provisions of the Stored Communications Act to
allow them to issue subpoenas to ISPs for the contents of the e-mail in question).
258

See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 204-05.

259

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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information on emails and IP addresses.”260 Government authorization to
retrieve this information is not difficult to obtain.261
[39] A few circuit court decisions involving use of computer networks
have addressed this issue. The Fourth Circuit held that an employee
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic files on his office
computer because of employment policies that explicitly authorized the
employer to “audit, inspect, and/or monitor” such files.262 The Ninth
Circuit, however, held that a university student did not waive an
expectation of privacy in his computer files on his personal computer even
though he attached it to the university network, because the university’s
policies did not allow blanket monitoring or specifically abrogate such an
expectation.263
In instances where a user agreement explicitly provides that
e-mails and other files will be monitored or audited as in
Simons, the user’s knowledge of this fact may well
extinguish his reasonable expectation of privacy. Without
such a statement, however, the service provider’s control
over the files and ability to access them under certain
limited circumstances will not be enough to overcome an
expectation of privacy . . . .264
Although Fourth Amendment law contains doctrines that might potentially
protect information in limited-access profiles, its application to OSN
profile information has not been tested, and some doubt exists as to
whether protection would survive constitutional scrutiny under the

260

SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 205.

261

See id. at 206.

262

United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).

263

See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

264

Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) vacated, 532 F.3d 521
(6th Cir. 2008).
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approach the Supreme Court has taken with respect to the rules described
above.265
VI. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY UNDER THE
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
[40] As in the United States, “[t]here is no explicit constitutional
protection of privacy in Canada . . . .”266 Canadian privacy protection
under its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, however, seeks to protect the
“dignity, integrity and autonomy” of its citizens.267 The Canadian
approach may provide a desirable middle ground between the privacy
approaches of the United States and Europe.268 However, recent decisions
determining the reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy
in limited-access OSN profile information have not provided much
guidance.269
A. The Parameters of Canadian Privacy Protection
[41] Two sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide
relevant privacy protection; Section 8 of the Canadian Charter protects
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government,270 in much the same way as the Fourth Amendment in the
United States,271 and Section 7 protects the “security of the person.”272
265

See Hodge, supra note 19, at 118-19.

266

Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 378.

267

R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, paras. 24, 27 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).

268

Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 357.

269

See Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 1, 32-33 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(WL); Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, paras. 1, 16, 17, 19, 20 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.) (WL).
270

See Canadian Charter supra note 38, § 8.

271

Levin & Nicholson, supra note 27, at 378.

272

Canadian Charter, supra note 38, § 7.
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Both of these sections rely in some measure on an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.273 In 1984, the Canadian Supreme Court declared
that such an expectation lies at the core of Section 8.274 Like the
American Fourth Amendment, Section 8 only protects against
governmental intrusions into expectations that are objectively
reasonable.275 In the criminal context, the court has outlined three
conditions that must be met for a search to be reasonable.276 These
requirements compare to those found in their U.S. counterpart, including
prior independent judicial authorization, often a warrant, based on
probable grounds that evidence of the offence will be found at the
searched location.277 Later courts, however, have determined that these
criteria do not establish necessarily hard and fast rules strictly applied in
every case, and some measure of reasonable analysis of the context of any
given search may warrant some leniency.278 Rather, the requirements are
designed to ensure a proper “balancing of the societal interests in
protecting individual dignity, integrity and autonomy with effective law
enforcement.” 279
273

Jason M. Young, Constitutional Rights in New Technologies in Canada, in
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 57, 65 (Ronald Leenes, Bert-Jaap
Koops & Paul De Hert eds., 2008) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS]; see R. v.
Mills, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL); Hunter v. Southam, Inc., 1984
CarswellAlta 121, para. 25 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).
274

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 63; see Southam, Inc., 1984
CarswellAlta 121, para. 25.
275

See Southam, Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, para. 24-25; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
supra note 273, at 63.
276

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 63-64.

277

See Southam, Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, para. 23; STANLEY A. COHEN, PRIVACY,
CRIME AND TERROR LEGAL RIGHTS AND SECURITY IN A TIME OF PERIL 114 (2005);
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 275, at 64.
278

See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 1990 CarswellOnt 92, para. 96 (Can.
S.C.C.) (WL);; COHEN, supra note 277; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 64;
see also R. v. Collins, 1987 CarswellBC 94, para. 22 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).
279

R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, para. 26 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).
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[42] Additionally, Section 8 applies to the appropriation of digital data
and files,280 and works alongside Section 7’s inherent privacy protection,
which protects an individual’s privacy as “either incidental to personal
security, or an aspect of personal liberty.”281 When determining whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in stored or acquired data and
other information, the courts have delineated a long list of relevant factors
to consider.282 In application, “the most determinative factor” in the
context of digital information has become the nature of the information
itself.283 Business information receives much less protection than more
personal data that reflects the “biographical core” of the individual, such
as information that reveals personal lifestyle choices.284 Additional nonpersonal information, such as public utility records, may not attract a
reasonable expectation of privacy.285 In R. v. Plant, the Supreme Court
stated that it agreed with the aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in United States v Miller that “[i]n order for constitutional protection to be
extended . . . the information seized must be of a personal and confidential
nature.”286 The court also held that,
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and
autonomy . . . [section] 8 . . . seek[s] to protect a
biographical core of personal information which
individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to
maintain and control from dissemination to the state. This
would include information which tends to reveal intimate

280

See R. v. Wong, 1990 CarswellOnt 58, paras. 8, 10, 13 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL),
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 64-65.
281

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 65 (footnote omitted).

282

Id. at 65-66.

283

Id. at 66.

284

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

285

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 68.

286

R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, para. 23, 27 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).
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details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the
individual.287
B. Communications Privacy in Canada
[43] The Canadian Criminal code provides strong privacy protection to
telephone communications.288 According to the Supreme Court, “the
interception of private communications is a serious matter, to be
considered only for the investigation of serious offences, in the presence
of probable grounds, and with a serious testing of the need for electronic
interception in the context of the particular investigation . . . .”289 Courts
require judicial authorization to intercept telephone conversations,290 and
only generally allow interception when “practically speaking, [there is] no
other reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances
of the particular criminal inquiry.”291 Despite these established rules
regarding wiretapping, however, some questions remain about how this
protection applies to e-mail and information in other digital contexts.292
Some lower courts have found that a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in e-mail correspondence, thus bringing it within the protections of
the Charter,293 however, this expectation of privacy is lower than that
granted to “first class (letter) mail, because unencrypted e-mails are
vulnerable to being read by intermediaries.”294 After Canadian adoption
287

Id. at para. 27.

288

See CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 71-72.

289

R. v. Araujo, 2000 CarswellBC 2440, para. 29 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL) (emphasis
omitted).
290

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 71.

291

Araujo, 2000 CarswellBC 2440, para. 29 (emphasis omitted).

292

See CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 72.

293

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 72; see, e.g., R. v. Weir, 1998
CarswellAlta 151, para. 77 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (WL).
294

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 72 -73; see Weir, 1998 CarswellAlta
151, paras. 72-75, 77 (“The envelope on first class mail shields the contents of the
message. The information on the cover carries a lower expectation of privacy than does
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of the European Convention on Cybercrime, the Government stated that it
would subject orders for the production of “specified computer data” or
“subscriber information” and Internet traffic data containing mostly
non-content data to this lower expectation of privacy as well.295 In a
Department of Justice consultation paper published in 2002, the
government stated that “the standard for Internet traffic data should be
more in line with that required for telephone records and dial number
recorders in light of the lower expectation of privacy in a telephone
number or Internet address, as opposed to the content of a
communication.”296 The constitutionality of this lower standard in such
data remains in question because Section 8 of the Charter “protects people,
not places”297 or things, and the degree of intrusiveness of an action
should depend on “to what extent disclosure of [the] information would
impact the reasonable expectation of the individual’s privacy.”298

the message inside. In the e-mail environment, the headers (hidden and exposed) can be
likened to the information on the envelope. The message is directed by its headers. Much
repair work to e-mail can be done through headers. Like the outside of the envelope, the
headers have a lower expectation of privacy. The difference between the two types of
cover is that in first class mail the cover is respected. In e-mail, the cover is (or was in
June of 1996) routinely violated in order to repair the technology. There are two or three
levels of violation depending on the type of repair done and excluding a repair done by
deleting the message or by enlarging the e-mail box. The size of the attachments may be
viewed. The list of attachment names may be viewed. The message itself may be opened
which can include looking at the message and the attachments or either. These facts about
the technology help [this court] to conclude the e-mail message is unlike first class mail
in the level of privacy that it can attract. Another difference between e-mail and first class
mail is that in order to make an e-mail message truly private, one can encrypt it.”).
295

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 73-74 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
296

DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., LAWFUL ACCESS – CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 11-12 (2002),
available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/la-al.pdf.
297

R. v. Edwards, 1996 CarswellOnt 1916, para. 45 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).

298

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 75 (citing Edwards, 1996 CarswellOnt
1916).
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C. Recent Decisions Involving OSN Profile Information
[44] Recent cases involving requests for discovery of profile
information have tested Canada’s respect for privacy in information
contained in OSN profiles. In fact, it is “beyond controversy” in Canada
that “a person’s Facebook profile may contain documents relevant to the
issues in an action.”299 The courts have had little difficulty allowing such
requests for publically available information, and courts have admitted
such information as evidence in a number of proceedings.300 However, in
Murphy v. Perger and Leduc v. Roman – both personal injury suits arising
out of automobile accidents – the court considered the appropriateness of
requests for limited-access Facebook profile information.301 In Murphy,
the plaintiff posted photos on her publicly accessible profile that showed
her “engaged in various social activities.”302 The defendant wanted access
to any photographs on the limited-access portion of the plaintiff’s
profile.303 In granting the defendant’s motion, the court stated that
It seems reasonable to conclude that there are likely to
be relevant photographs on the site for two reasons. First,
www.facebook.com is a social networking site where [the
court] understand[s] a very large number of photographs
299

Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 23 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).

300

See id. (“Photographs of parties posted to their Facebook profiles have been admitted
as evidence relevant to demonstrating a party’s ability to engage in sports and other
recreational activities where the plaintiff has put his enjoyment of life or ability to work
in issue: Cikojevic v. Timm, 2008 BCSC 74 (B.C. Master), para. 47; R. (C.M.) v. R
(O.D.), 2008 NBQB 253 (N.B. Q.B.), paras. 54 and 61; Kourtesis v. Joris, [2007] O.J.
No. 2677 (Ont. S.C.J.), paras. 72 to 75; Goodridge (Litigation Guardian of) v. King, 161
A.C.W.S. (3d) 984 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [2007 CarswellOnt 7637 (Ont. S.C.J.)], para. 128. In
one case the discovery of photographs of a party posted on a MySpace webpage formed
the basis for a request to produce additional photographs not posted on the site: Weber v.
Dyck, [2007] O.J. No. 2384 (Ont. Master).”).
301

See Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 1; Murphy v. Peger, 2007 CarswellOnt
9439, paras. 1-2 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
302

Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 4.

303

See id. at para. 1.
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are deposited by its audience. Second, given that the public
site includes photographs, it seems reasonable to conclude
the private site would as well.
On the issue of relevancy, in this case, clearly the
plaintiff must consider that some photographs are relevant
to her claim because she has served photographs of her
prior to the accident, notwithstanding that they are only
"snapshots in time."304
The court ordered the production of the limited-access profile information
at issue, concluding that “any invasion of privacy is minimal and is
outweighed by the defendant's need to have the photographs in order to
assess the case.”305 The court considered the number of the plaintiff’s
friends who could access the sought after contents of the plaintiff’s profile
as specifically determinative, holding that “[t]he plaintiff could not have a
serious expectation of privacy given that 366 people have been granted
access to the private site.”306
[45] More recently, the Superior Court of Ontario rejected the decision
of a Master and permitted the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff on
his Supplementary Affidavit of Documents “regarding the kind of content
posted on his [private] Facebook profile.”307 In Leduc, the defendant
sought production of material on the plaintiff’s private profile after the
plaintiff admitted during his psychiatric examination that he had many
friends on Facebook.308 His Facebook profile was almost exclusively
private, and the public page contained only his name and photograph.309
In his contrary decision, the Master had concluded the defendant engaged
304

Id. at paras. 17-18.

305

Id. at para. 20 (emphasis added).

306

Id.

307

Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 36-37 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).

308

See id. at paras. 3, 6.

309

Id. at para. 5.
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in “‘a fishing expedition,’” had failed to show that relevant materials were
likely to be found in the plaintiff’s profile, and had also failed to ask the
plaintiff during discovery whether any relevant photos existed in any
form.310
[46] The court found no problem with the idea that information
obtained from publicly accessible OSN profiles fell within the proper
scope of discovery.311 The court also agreed with the Murphy decision
that “it is reasonable to infer from the presence of content on the party’s
public profile that similar content likely exists on the private profile.”312
However, most importantly, the court concluded that
Where, as in the present case, a party maintains only a
private Facebook profile and his public page posts nothing
other than information about the user’s identity . . . a court
can infer from the social networking purpose of Facebook,
and the applications it offers to users such as the posting of
photographs, that users intend to take advantage of
Facebook’s applications to make personal information
available to others.313
The court further found that
A party who maintains a private, or limited access,
Facebook profile stands in no different position than one
who sets up a publicly-available profile . . . . Mr. Leduc
exercised control over a social networking and information
site to which he allowed designated “friends” access. It is
reasonable to infer that his social networking site likely

310

See id. at para. 32.

311

See id. at paras. 27, 29.

312

Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 30.

313

Id. at para. 31.
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contains some content relevant to the issue of how Mr.
Leduc has been able to lead his life since the accident.314
These two decisions, although concerned primarily with the application of
Canadian Civil Procedure rules to OSN profile information, illustrate the
limited sanctity afforded an individual’s otherwise subjective expectation
that his private OSN profile information will stay private.315 When courts
define an order to produce limited-access photographs and other
information as a “minimal” invasion of privacy, solely because courts can
“infer” from the general nature of social networking websites that a
plaintiff has posted relevant information to their profile, courts severely
curtail an individual’s subjective – and arguably reasonable – expectation
of privacy.316
VII. PROTECTING PRIVACY ON GROUNDS OF HUMAN DIGNITY:
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
[47] Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“Convention”) delineates a specific right related to individual privacy,
namely that signatory nations respect a person’s right to “his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.”317 This right provides for
both negative and positive obligations upon public authorities bound by

314

Id. at para. 32.

315

See generally id. at paras. 31-32; Murphey v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para.
17-18 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
316

See Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 25, 32.

317

ECHR, supra note 39 (“[1] Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence. [2] There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”).
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the Convention.318 Public authorities may only interfere with this right to
a private life when, “in accordance with the law,” such action “is
necessary in a democratic society” and related to important national
interests such as “national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country,” or “for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”319 This requirement therefore compels a balancing of
“the competing interests of the individual and of the whole
community.”320 The court has held that the phrase “in accordance with the
law” means any interfering action must accord with national law and that
the national law itself must reflect the rights protected by the
Convention.321
[48] Indeed, because “there must be a measure of legal protection in
domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the
rights safeguarded by [Article 8 § 1]”322 the Court subjects the national
laws themselves to its test of adequacy under Article 8.323 National laws
must give individuals adequate warning of those circumstances where
national authorities may interfere with the individual’s private life.324 If

318

See, K.U. v. Finland, No. 2872/02, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52, 1248 § 42 (2009)
(“[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially to protect the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life.”)
(citation omitted).
319

ECHR, supra note 39, at art.8 § 1.

320

See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 68 § 57.

321

Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 867 § 45
(2007).
322

Id.

323

Id. § 46.

324

See, e.g., id.

50

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

they do not, action in reliance on the law that interferes with an
individual’s private life may violate the Convention.325
[49] Despite differences among various jurisdictions,326 this European
take on privacy generally centers on protecting an individual’s dignity.327
Protecting dignity, unlike the more American focus on liberty, finds its
focus on guarding social status and protecting individuals from
humiliation and preventing unwarranted social perception, and is a social
concept that reflects social norms.328 These social values are apparent in
European data protection legislation,329 as well as in case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. National courts in dualist jurisdictions,
like the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland, which require
implementing legislation to give full effect to the Convention in domestic
law, “are obliged to take ‘into account’ the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights . . . when determining questions which arise ‘in
connection’ with the right to respect for private life” in the implementing
legislation.330 In addition, with adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the
European Union officially acceded to the ECHR331 and the Convention
has become part of the general law of the Union332 granting the ECHR’s
decisions greater institutional backing in Europe. The Treaty of Lisbon

325

See id. § 48-49.

326

See generally Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 389-90.

327

Id. at 388.

328

See id.

329

Id. at 390.

330

N. A. Moreham, The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on
Human Rights: A Re-Examination, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV., 2008, at 44, 44.
331

Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities, art. 1, § 8, para. 2, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/
12007L/htm/12007L.html.
332

Id. at para. 3.
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also grants the European Charter – and its core respect for human dignity
– “the same legal value as the Treaties.”333
A. The Right to a Private Life Under Article 8
[50] The European Court of Human Rights has broadly interpreted the
right of privacy.334 Among its broad protections, Article 8’s guarantee of
a private life “is primarily intended to ensure the development, without
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations
with other human beings.”335 It specifically protects an individual’s right
to “a sphere within which he or she can freely pursue the development and
fulfilment [sic] of his or her personality”336 and “the right to establish
details of their identity as individual human beings.”337 Protection for the
development of personality does not apply only to private matters kept
within the individual’s closest circle,338 but explicitly encompasses the
“right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and
the outside world” as well.339 Interaction with others – even in a public
context or involving matters of a business or professional nature340 – may

333

Id. at para. 1.

334

See infra notes 335-41 and accompanying text.

335

Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 66 § 50; see also Botta v. Italy,
1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 412, 422 § 32; Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 33
§ 29 (1992).
336

Sidabras v. Lithuania, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 367, 385 § 43.

337

Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31 § 90; see also Pretty v.
United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 193 § 61.
338

Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 § 29.

339

Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 142 § 57.

340

Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33-34 § 29 (“[I]t is, after all, in the course of their
working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest,
opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world.”).
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fall within the scope of Article 8’s notion of “private life.”341 When
determining whether a person’s activities in the public sphere implicate
private life considerations, that person’s reasonable expectations of
privacy can be a significant factor.342 As such, appropriate and expected
analog or technical monitoring – as by closed-circuit video cameras – may
not be a problem.343 However, “the recording of the data and the
systematic or permanent nature of the record may give rise to such
considerations.”344 In a recent case, sounding much like Warren and
Brandeis in 1890, the court stated that “increased vigilance in protecting
private life is necessary to contend with new communication technologies
which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data.”345
B. Legitimate and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
[51] All individuals – both those known broadly to the public and those
absent from the public spotlight – “enjoy a ‘legitimate expectation’ of
protection and respect for their private [lives].”346 In addition, individuals
may enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in their telephone calls,347
e-mails, and Internet usage,348 which extends to information about the
length and time of the communication as well as the numbers dialled.349
341

Von Hannover v Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 66 § 50; Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 142 § 57; P.G. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 217 § 56.
342

See P.G., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 217 § 57; see also Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at
142 § 58.
343

See Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 142 §§ 58-59; P.G., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R at 217-18
§ 57.
344

Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 142 § 59; see P.G., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R at 218 § 57.

345

Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 71 § 70.

346

Id. § 69; Halford v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1004, 1016 §45.

347

See, e.g., Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 866
§ 42 (2007); see Halford, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1016 § 45.
348

Copland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 at 866 § 42.

349

See id. at 867 § 43.
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Under ECHR jurisprudence, an expectation of privacy exists in this
non-content oriented information such as “the date and length of telephone
conversations and in particular the numbers dialled [sic]” because “such
information constitutes an ‘integral element of the communications made
by telephone.’”350 This recognition contrasts with United States law
withholding constitutional privacy protection for “pen register”
information because, by initiating the communication, the individual has
voluntarily revealed it to the third party communications service provider,
thus waiving any legitimate expectation.351
[52] The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test found its way into the
ECHR’s private life jurisprudence in the 1997 case of Halford v. The
United Kingdom.352 In that case, a government employee sued the
government for intercepting telephone conversations made from her office
and home phones and reviewing the resulting transcripts.353 Because Ms.
Halford had no reason to expect anyone might monitor her telephone
conversations, the court concluded that she maintained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her calls made from her office telephone.354
Following Halford, the court has begun to utilize the reasonable
expectations test as “a nuanced approach to every new case” in line with
common sense.355 In Von Hannover v. Germany, Judge Zupančič stated in
his concurring opinion that he would suggest the outcome of that case turn
350

Id. (quoting Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 1984 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 289, 292 (Eur. Ct. H.R.); see also Moreham, supra note 333, at 63.
351

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). On the other hand, Title III of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) provides for some limited protection of
pen register type information against action by the government. See generally Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-23 (2006). Under Title III, this
requires a court order upon a showing that information relevant to a criminal
investigation is likely to be obtained. See id § 3123(a).
352

Halford, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1016 §§ 44-45.

353

See id. at 1010-11 §§ 16-17.

354

Id. at 1016 § 45.

355

Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 78 (Zupančič, J., concurring).
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on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test set out in Halford.356 The
court has also found the test useful in a number of other contexts.357
C. Protection for Activities in the Public Sphere
[53] Another major difference between the jurisprudence of the ECHR
and Fourth Amendment law in the United States is the fact that public
activities can be appropriate subject matter of protected private life under
Article 8.358 In a recent, and rather famous example, Von Hannover v.
Germany, the court held that Princess Caroline of Monaco had a
“legitimate expectation” in the protection of her private life that extended
to her activities in public.359 The court found that the German laws that
allowed the publication of paparazzi photographs and articles about the
applicant’s non-official activities violated Article 8.360 Interestingly, the
court found that “scenes from her daily life . . . such as engaging in sport,
out walking, leaving a restaurant or on holiday” constituted “activities of a
purely private nature.”361 Thus, even in the case of a person used to the
public spotlight and, “although the public has a right to be informed,” the
situation in that case “[did] not come within the sphere of any political or
public debate because the published photos and accompanying
commentaries relate exclusively to details of the applicant’s private
life.”362
356

Id.

357

See, e.g., Peev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 64209/01, HUDOC, § 38 (Eur. Ct. H. R.) (July
26, 2007); Perry v. United Kingdom, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, 151 § 37, 153 §43
(using the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the Court decided that the covert
filming of a person on the premises of the police was an interference with his private
life); P.G. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, 217 § 57; see also Peck v.
United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 142 § 58.
358

See supra Part V; infra pp. 56-57.
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Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 48 §§ 8-10, 73 § 78 (2004) (Zupančič, J.,
concurring (internal quotation marks omitted).
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See id. at 64 § 45 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 69 § 61.
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Id. at 70 § 64.

55

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

D. Protection for Communication and Correspondence
[54] The Court has not qualified the Article 8 term “correspondence” in
the same way as the term “life” by any requirement that it be “private.”363
Telephone calls, e-mail, diaries, letters, and Internet usage, even in places
of employment, fall within the scope of Article 8’s prohibition on
unjustified interference with an individual’s correspondence.364 As
previously stated, individuals may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in these forms of communication.365 Unjustified monitoring,
recording, or other interference with an individual’s correspondence
violates Article 8’s prohibition.366
[55] In Niemietz v. Germany, the ECHR concluded that a search of the
applicant’s law office and client files, pursuant to a court ordered warrant,
violated Article 8.367 The court found that the term “correspondence”
encompassed some information contained in the lawyer’s client files 368
and that the warrant was overly broad despite being in accordance with
German law.369 Because the warrant and search were not proportionate to
the legitimate aims of the law, the Court concluded the search violated the
applicant’s rights under Article 8.370
363

Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at, 34 § 41 32 (1992).
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See Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 866 § 41
(2007); see also Moreham, supra note 330, at 62-64.
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See Copland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 at 866 § 42 (holding true unless, for instance in
the workplace, they have advance warning that their use was subject to monitoring); Von
Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66 § 51; Halford v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1004, 1016 § 45.
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See Enea v. Italy, App. No. 74912/01, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 135 § 135 (2009) (ordering
monitoring of a prisoner’s correspondence); Huvig v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, 52 §
25 (1990) (telephone tapping).
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See Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29 § 11, 41 § 59.
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Id. at 34 § 32.
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See id. at35 §§ 34-35, 36 § 37.
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Id. at36 §§ 37-38.
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[56] In Copland v. The United Kingdom, the court held that a public
college’s monitoring of an employee’s telephone and e-mail
correspondence and Internet usage, “in order to ascertain whether the
applicant was making excessive use of College facilities for personal
purposes,” violated Article 8.371 The government admitted to conducting
“analysis of the college telephone bills showing telephone numbers called,
the dates and times of the calls and their length and cost.”372 The
government also admitted to analyzing the applicant’s Internet usage,373
and logging her e-mail correspondence.374 The court held that because the
applicant “had been given no warning that her calls would be liable to
monitoring,” she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her telephone
calls, e-mail, and Internet usage.375 Consequently, “the collection and
storage of personal information relating to the applicant's telephone, as
well as to her email and internet usage, without her knowledge, amounted
to an interference with her right to respect for her private life and
correspondence within the meaning of [Article 8].”376 Because no United
Kingdom law directly applied in force during the relevant time frame, the
employer’s conduct was not “in accordance with the law” or in
furtherance of other legitimate aims.377 As such, the conduct violated
Article 8.378
[57] Recently, in the case of K.U. v. Finland, the ECHR decided a
rather different question related to Article 8 and involving the use of the
371

Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 860 § 10
(2007).
372

Id.

373

Id. at 860 § 11.
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Id. § 12.

375

Id. at 866 § 42.
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Copland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 at 867 § 44.

377

Id. at 868 § 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at § 49.
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Internet.379 The court found that communications privacy and freedom of
expression must, on occasion, take a back seat to violations of an
individual’s private life in the context of criminal activity.380 In the case,
an unknown person placed a personal dating advertisement on the Internet,
identifying himself as the applicant, a 12-year-old boy, and claiming an
interest in a sexual encounter with another boy or man.381 The applicant
received an e-mail from a man, offering to meet him, and “then to see
what you want.”382 The boy’s father contacted the police and attempted to
discover the identity of the person who posted the advertisement, but the
ISP refused to turn over the information on confidentiality grounds.383
The Helsinki District Court also refused a request from the police to
require the ISP turn over the information.384 The ECHR reiterated that
respect for private or family life imposed positive obligations on the
State,385 and held that “where fundamental values and essential aspects of
private life are at stake, [Article 8] requires efficient criminal-law
provisions.”386 Because the State did not provide the applicant or the
police with an effective opportunity to fully address the interference by
identifying the perpetrator, the State violated Article 8.387 The court stated
that,
Although freedom of expression and confidentiality of
communications are primary considerations and users of
379

See generally K.U. v. Finland, No. 2872/02, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52, 1246 § 35 (2009).

380

See id. at 1248 § 45.
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See id. at 1239 §§ 7-8.
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Id. § 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. § 9.
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See Finland, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 at 1239 §§ 10-11.
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Id. at 1248 § 42.
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Id. § 43.
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See id. at 1250 § 49.
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telecommunications and internet services must have a
guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression
will be respected, such guarantee cannot be absolute and
must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives,
such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.388
[58] As these decisions make clear, the privacy protection granted by
Article 8 of the Convention goes well beyond that granted by the Fourth
Amendment in the United States. In addition, these decisions also show
the strong tendency of the court to accept a much broader view of what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.389 Much of this effect
likely owes its origins to the Convention’s conception of protecting private
life out of respect for human dignity, rather than focusing merely on
control.390 Granted, the court’s decisions turn on the issue of whether the
state has acted in accordance with national laws authorizing the action in
question.391 However, as mentioned earlier, the national laws remain
subject to the court’s review and the court has actively found violations
when state action infringes an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.392 By finding these reasonable expectations in public activities,
e-mail, Internet usage, communication from work, and non-content
communication information – many of which would not withstand current
Fourth Amendment scrutiny – the court protected the theoretical
groundwork of protecting human dignity and the right to a private life.
The court therefore potentially provided greater protection to the
quasi-private personal information posted to limited–access OSN profiles
intended only for viewing by a defined audience.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
[59] Many OSN users subjectively expect only those to whom they
grant access will view the information they post or upload to their
profiles.393 This conception builds on the privacy tools embedded into
technologies employed by the OSNs, which allow users the opportunity to
control their own privacy settings.394 It is a conception built on
expectations of selective anonymity395 and network privacy.396 However,
concerns about preserving reputation and dignity often stimulate control
exercised by these users when they restrict their privacy settings. These
concerns are legitimate, and these expectations arguably reasonable. Yet
few courts respect these expectations as something that society is currently
prepared to recognize as reasonable, and many courts have not yet tackled
the issue head on.397 Although, with the numbers of online socializers
growing398 – likely concomitant with the number of those holding these
subjective expectations of OSN privacy – and the judiciary becoming
more familiar with the technology and with these types of cases, perhaps
that recognition is possible in the not so distant future. This recognition
can be facilitated in multiple ways, including, as this paper has argued, by
adopting more contemporary conceptions of what constitutes reasonable
expectations of privacy and by affording more respect for human dignity
in tests of reasonableness. Because the private life jurisprudence of the
ECHR, rooted in the importance of protecting human dignity and
reputation by actively preserving respect for the private life and personal
matters of the individual, covers the important elements of relationship
building, individual relations with other human beings, and the
development of personal identity – and not only in purely private settings
393

See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1001-02.

394

See id. at 1035, 1045-46.
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See id. at 1025.

396
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– its application in the digital communication context fills a void found in
the laws of other jurisdictions.
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